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Abstract
On the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathemat-
ics, I will develop an amended account of the Kantian–Reichenbachian con-
ception of constitutive a priori. It will be shown that the features (attributes,
qualities, properties) attributed to a real object are not possessed by the ob-
ject as a “thing-in-itself”; they require a physical theory by means of which
these features are constituted. It will be seen that the existence of such a
physical theory implies that a physical object can possess a property only
if other contingently existing physical objects exist; therefore, the intrinsic–
extrinsic distinction is flawed.
Forthcoming in Foundations of Physics
Introduction
1. There is a long-standing debate in contemporary metaphysics about the
precise definition of intrinsic property. The great majority of the suggested defi-
nitions are some enhanced version of Jaegwon Kim’s (1982) definition, express-
ing the following simple idea:
Intrinsic properties are the properties a particular object would
have even if no other contingently existing objects existed in the
world. [1]
Although Kim’s definition has been widely accepted as basically adequate cri-
terion of intrinsicality, it has been challenged by subtle examples and amended
at several points. Beyond these improvements, the intrinsic–extrinsic distinc-
tion is often discussed in a wider context of other closely related metaphysi-
cal problems, such as categorical–dispositional, pure–impure, relational–non-
relational, interior–exterior distinctions; the problem of identity, duplicate, per-
sistence; or the problem of Cambridge change. (E.g. [19, 27, 16, 32, 18, 11, 20,
21, 22]) It is not my intention, however, to review these debates, as the aim of
this paper is to challenge the concept of intrinsicality from a completely differ-
ent point of view and to show that the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction is flawed
on a more fundamental level.
2. Accordingly, my analysis will be restricted in two significant senses:
(a) The discussion will be restricted to the case of ordinary physical proper-
ties of physical objects.
(b) The whole analysis will remain within a radical physicalist ontological
doctrine: The world can be completely accounted for by assuming that
only physical entities exist.
Constitutive a priori
3. An object can possess a property X only if the term X has meaning. This
might sound too radical. Probably, a less radical statement would be easily ac-
cepted: The knowledge claim that an object possesses a property X is possible
only if the term X has meaning. But, just here is the philosophically relevant
point: this is not simply a matter of semantics. As Reichenbach pointed out in
his Relativity Theory and A Priori Knowledge (1920) [25], the coordinative defini-
tions, that is, the semantic conventions by which physical quantities or concep-
tions are defined in empirical terms, play constitutive role; they are constitutive
a priori. “They define the individual elements of reality and in this sense consti-
tute the real object.” [25, p. 53]
Reichenbach sharply distinguishes two different aspects of Kantian a priori:
Kant’s concept of a priori has two different meanings. First, it
means “necessarily true” or “true for all times,” and secondly, “con-
stituting the concept of object.”
The second meaning must be clarified. According to Kant, the
object of knowledge, the thing of appearance, is not immediately
given. Perceptions do not give the object, only the material of which
it is constructed. Such constructions are achieved by an act of judg-
ment. The judgment is the synthesis constructing the object from
the manifold of the perception. For this purpose it orders the per-
ceptions according to a certain schema; depending on the choice of
the schema, either an object or a certain type of relation will result.
Intuition is the form in which perceptions present the material—
thus performing another synthesis. But the conceptual schema, the
category, creates the object; the object of science is therefore not a
“thing-in-itself” but a reference structure based on intuition and
constituted by categories. [25, pp. 48-49]
4. Let me give an example. Electrodynamics begins with the operational
definitions of the basic electrodynamic quantities. For example, electric field
strength is defined as the force felt by the unit test charge in electromagnetic
field, when the test charge is at rest.1 This operational definition, therefore
the notion of physical quantity called electric field strength is a priori in the
sense that it is prior to our empirical knowledge about the electromagnetic
field. There are no empirical facts which would determine the convention by
1For the sake of simplicity I use this naive definition. For more precise operational definitions
of electrodynamic quantities, see [13].
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which this physical quantity is defined. In other words, the electromagnetic
field, as a “thing-in-itself” does not determine that such a physical quantity is
necessarily introduced for its characterization, as one of its fundamental fea-
ture. (In fact, the so called “displacement vector”, a different physical quantity
having a completely different operational definition, is an equally good alter-
native for the description of electromagnetic field.)
Once electric field strength is introduced, we can observe empirical facts
about it. We can measure, for example, the electric field strength around a
point charge being at rest, and, by inductive generalization, we can ascertain
the Coulomb Law: E = kQr2 . To be sure, the law of physics we ascertained is a
posteriori; it can be known only from empirical observations. But the features of
the physical reality that the physical law talks about is a priori constructed by us.
5. All this means that the features (attributes, qualities, properties) at-
tributed to a real object are not possessed by the object as a “thing-in-itself”;
they require the existence of something else, an epistemic agent constituting
them. This recognition outlines an argument against intrinsic–extrinsic dis-
tinction.
6. However, the Kantian–Reichenbachian account raises several problems.
It is not clear at all what kind of ontological entity is involved by the required
epistemic agency. Is it a contingently existing flesh and blood physical being?
Or is it an abstract entity, as sometimes the Kantian “transcendental subject”
is interpreted? [9, p. 53] To what extend is a semantic convention free? Are
there “coordinating principles”, “prescriptions for the conceptual side of the
coordination”, as Reichenbach [25, p. 54] presupposes? And what is the ori-
gin of such principles? Logic and mathematics? Are logical and mathematical
truths necessary truths? If so, how to avoid then necessarily true synthetic a pri-
ori statements about the physical world? Finally, how to incorporate semantic
and epistemological holism, the fact that “our statements about the external
world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a cor-
porate body” [24]?
In the next sections, I will attempt to formulate the argument outlined in
point 5, in such a way that the above mentioned problems will be resolved or
avoided. To achieve this aim, however, I need to redraw a larger picture.
Physico-formalist account of logic and mathematics
7. I begin with a physicalist account of logic and mathematics. How can
the logical and mathematical facts be accommodated in a purely physical on-
tology? Physicalism denies the existence of mental and abstract entities; con-
sequently, there is no room left for any kind of platonism or mentalism in the
philosophy of logic and mathematics. Therefore, two possibilities are left: a
Millian-style physical realist approach, and formalism. We can disregard from
the Millian realism, in which mathematics itself becomes a physical theory, in
the sense of physical theory as described in the next section. So, formalism
– more precisely, what I will call physico-formalism – seems to be the only
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account for logic and mathematics that can be compatible with physicalism.
Therefore, the formalist approach is our starting point.
First we need to clarify: What are the logical/mathematical facts? The for-
malist thesis can be summarized in one famous sentence of Hilbert: “Math-
ematics is a game played according to certain simple rules with meaningless
marks.” [6, p. 38] Accordingly, in the formalist account, a mathematical state-
ment/fact/truth is like “Σ ` A”. According to the formalist view, neither A nor
the elements of Σ are statements, which could be true or false. They are just
meaningless strings, formulas of the formal system in question. The entailment
` relation has nothing to do with “truth preserving if-then-type reasoning”; it
simply stands for the fact that there is a finite sequence of meaningless strings
of symbols, fitting into some structural patterns called “derivation rules”. As
a visual illustration, Fig. 1 shows a short example: the first order axiomatic
formulation of group theory and the proof that p(e, p(e, e)) = e is a theorem;
specifically, the sequence of formulas (1)–(9) constitutes a proof.
8. How can a formal system be accommodated in a purely physical ontol-
ogy? Where are the states of affairs located in the physical world that make
propositions like “Σ ` A” true or false? For example, what are the facts
of the physical world that make the sequence of formulas (1)–(9) a proof of
p(e, p(e, e)) = e in Fig 1? Consider the first formula (1) in the proof. From
ontological point of view, what does it mean that it is nothing else but axiom
(G2)? It means that the formula p(e, x) = x in row (1) is the same as the formula
p(e, x) = x in row (G2). More exactly: it means the physical fact that the arrange-
ment of black and white pixels on the screen of my laptop on which I am writ-
ing this paper – or the arrangement of ink particles on the printout – in row (1)
and the corresponding arrangement of black and white pixels in row (G2) are
similar (congruent). Similarly, what does it mean that formula ∀xp(e, x) = x
in (2) is obtained from p(e, x) = x by the derivation rule (G)? It means that re-
placing the pixel-configuration φ in φ ` ∀xφ , with copy/paste, by p(e, x) = x
in (1), the resulted pixel-configuration is p(e, x) = x ` ∀xp(e, x) = x, such that
the left hand side is similar to the pixel-configuration p(e, x) = x in (1) and the
right hand side is similar to ∀xp(e, x) = x in (2). And so on and so forth.
Of course, a formal system can be thought of in different physical forms;
written with ink on paper, in the form of brain states and brain processes, in
the form of electronic states and electronic processes in a computer, etc. What
is important is the following observation:
The physico-formalist thesis The logical and mathematical facts, since
being formal facts, are nothing but physical facts of physically existing
formal systems consisting of signs and derivation patterns embodied in
concrete physical objects, concrete physical configurations, and concrete
physical processes. [28, 29, 30]
The physico-formalist account remains completely within the physicalist ontol-
ogy: there is no need for hypostatized entities – abstract, conceptual, or mental
formal systems – which exist over and above the physically existing formal sys-
tems embodied in concrete physical objects, concrete physical configurations,
and concrete physical processes.
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Alphabet
variables x, y, z, . . .
individual constants e (identity)
function symbols i, p (inverse, product)
predicate symbol =
logical symbols ∀,¬ →
OTHERS (, ), ,
Derivation rules
(MP) {φ, (φ→ ψ)} ` ψ (modus ponens)
(G) φ ` ∀xφ (generalization)
Axioms
(PC1) φ→ (ψ→ φ)
(PC2) (φ→ (ψ→ χ))→ ((φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ χ))
(PC3) (¬φ→ ¬ψ)→ (ψ→ φ)
(PC4) ∀x (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ∀xψ) [given that x is not free in φ]
(PC5) ∀xφ→ φ [given that x is not free in φ]
(PC6) ∀xφ(x)→ φ(t) [if t is a term which is free for x in φ(x)]
(E1) x = x
(E2) t = s→ f n (u1, u2, . . . , t, . . . un) = f n (u1, u2, . . . , s, . . . un)
(E3) t = s→ (φ (u1, u2, . . . , t, . . . un)→ φ (u1, u2, . . . , s, . . . un))
(G1) p(p(x, y), z) = p(x, p(y, z))
(G2) p(e, x) = x
(G3) p(i(x), x) = e
Theorem: p(e, p(e, e)) = e
Proof:
(1) p(e, x) = x (G2)
(2) ∀xp(e, x) = x (G)
(3) ∀xp(e, x) = x → p(e, e) = e (PC6)
(4) p(e, e) = e (2), (3), (MP)
(5) ∀xp(e, x) = x → p(e, p(e, e)) = p(e, e) (PC6)
(6) p(e, p(e, e)) = p(e, e) (2), (5), (MP)
(7) p(e, e) = e→ (p(e, p(e, e)) = p(e, e)→ p(e, p(e, e)) = e) (E3)
(8) p(e, p(e, e)) = p(e, e)→ p(e, p(e, e)) = e (4), (7), (MP)
(9) p(e, p(e, e)) = e (6), (8), (MP)
Figure 1: Group theory and one of its theorems
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Figure 2: In order to isolate the common essential features of different physi-
cally existing formal systems L1, L2,, L3, . . . Ln we must have a “meta-theory” of
L1, L2,, L3, . . . Ln, using another physically existing formal system M.
9. “Abstract” or “mathematical” formal system is often conceived as an
entity obtained by abstraction, by isolating the common features in a num-
ber of particular physically existing formal systems. To maintain the physico-
formalist thesis, it is worthwhile to illustrate that such an abstraction does not
lead out of the realm of the physically existing formal systems.
Consider a number of different physically existing formal systems
L1, L2, . . . Ln, embodied in different particular physical systems (Fig. 2). To ab-
stract from some peculiar properties of physical objects L1, L2, . . . Ln, and to
isolate the common essential features of them, first of all requires knowledge
of the properties of the physical objects in question. That is, we must have a
physical theory (M, S) – in the sense of the definition of physical theory in the
next section – describing L1, L2,, L3, . . . Ln, using another physically existing for-
mal system M. Abstraction is a relationship, formulated in (M, S), between
two, a more detailed and a less detailed, representations of L1, L2,, L3, . . . Ln.
Only in a suitable formal system M it is meaningful to talk about similarity
or isomorphism between the structures describing L1, L2, . . . Ln, and, for exam-
ple, about the equivalence class of these structures, which could be regarded
as the product of the abstraction process. But, all these are contained in M, a
formal system existing in the physical world. Thus, abstraction does not lead
out of the physical realm. It does not produce “abstract formal systems” over
and above the physically existing ones. One physically embodied formal sys-
tem can be applied in the description of another physically embodied formal
system, that’s all.
10. Thus, any statement about a formal system – including a statement like
“Σ ` A” – is a statement of a physical fact; consequently, it has exactly the
same epistemological status as any other statements about the physical world.
This has far-reaching consequences, of course: Logical and mathematical truths
express objective (mind independent) facts of a particular part of the physical
world, namely, the facts of the formal systems themselves. As such, they are
synthetic, a posteriori, not necessary, and not certain; they are fallible. But they
have contingent factual content, as any similar scientific assertion, so they “can
be true and useful and surprising” [5, p. 72]. The logical and mathematical
facts can be discovered, like any other facts of nature, just like a fact about a
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plastic molecule, or other artifact.
The fact that the formal systems usually are simple physical systems of rel-
atively stable behavior, like a clockwork, and that the knowledge of logical
and mathematical truths does not require observations of the physical world
external to the formal systems explains the universal illusion that logical and
mathematical truths are necessary, certain and a priori.
Physical theory
11. A physical theory, providing a description of a certain part of physical
reality, symbolically denoted by U, can be considered as a partially interpreted
formal system. Symbolically I will denote such a theory by (L, S), where L is
the formal system in question, and S stands for the semantics of the theory,
which we are going to define in the next point. The formal system L is meant
to include the language of the theory, the derivation patterns, and the axiom
system which will be denoted below by ΣL. Traditionally, the axioms are di-
vided into the logical axioms,2 the axioms of some mathematical theories, and,
of course, some physical axioms.
This approach goes back to Carnap’s Theories as Partially Interpreted Formal
Systems (1939):
Any physical theory, and likewise the whole physics, can in this
way be presented in the form of an interpreted system, consist-
ing of a specific calculus (axiom system) and a system of semantic
rules for its interpretation; the axiom system is, tacitly or explicitly,
based upon a logico-mathematical calculus with customary inter-
pretation. [7, Section 23]
The account developed in the present paper may be taken in a way congru-
ous with the original Carnapian view, but it differs in two significant ways.
First, according to the (physico-)formalist approach, the “logico-mathematical
calculus” in itself is just a formal system without “customary interpretation”
whatsoever. Second, according to the conception of semantics presented in the
next points, the link between the elements of the formal system and the phys-
ical world is not contained in the language of the theory, in the form of some
correspondence rules. Rather, as will be seen, semantics is something partly
external to the language of the theory; a phenomenon jointly produced by the
formal system L and the part of the external physical reality U to be described.
12. The definition will be based on the intuition we can learn from Gödel’s
construction of representation of the meta-arithmetic statements in Peano
arithmetic, in the preparation of the first incompleteness theorem (e.g. [8, pp.
52-54]; [14, pp. 145-146]). Gödel clearly defines, when we are entitled to say
that a formula of a formal system (in his case, a formula of Peano arithmetic)
represents/means/refers to a state of affairs of the world outside of the for-
mal system (in his case, in meta-arithmetic). For example, consider the meta-
2Although it is not important from the point of view of our present concern, it is worthwhile
mentioning that there are strong arguments in favor of first-order logic, both in foundations of
mathematics and in the axiomatization of physical theories. (E.g. [4, 31, 2])
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arithmetic statement that ‘the formula–sequence of Gödel number x consti-
tutes a proof of the formula of Gödel number y’, symbolized as Pr(x, y). Let
{Pr(x, y)}x,y denote the family of similar meta-arithmetic statements. For a
given pair of Gödel numbers x and y, Pr(x, y) can either be the case or not
be the case. In Gödel’s construction, finally, we have a corresponding family
{R(x¯, y¯)}x,y of formulas of PA, where x¯ and y¯ are the numerals correspond-
ing to the Gödel numbers x and y. The elements of {R(x¯, y¯)}x,y represent the
elements of {Pr(x, y)}x,y, specifically, R(x¯, y¯) represents Pr(x, y), due to the
satisfaction of the following condition: for all Gödel numbers x and y, that is,
for all paired Pr(x, y) and R(x¯, y¯) from the two families,
if Pr(x, y) is the case then ΣPA ` R(x¯, y¯) (1)
if Pr(x, y) is not the case then ΣPA ` ¬R(x¯, y¯) (2)
where ΣPA denotes the axioms of Peano arithmetic. The regularity that the
above condition holds for the whole family {Pr(x, y)}x,y of meta-arithmetic
statements of a certain type is an essential ingredient of Gödel’s conception of
representation, and plays an important role in the proof of the theorem (e.g. [8,
pp. 55-56]). For, for example, nothing would follow from assigning, by conven-
tion, one single true meta-arithmetic statement to one single theorem of PA. As
a matter of fact, the meta-language expression ‘if . . . then’ in lines (1)–(2) would
be meaningless if {Pr(x, y)}x,y and {R(x¯, y¯)}x,y had only one element.
Mutatis mutandis, a (partial) semantics for a formal system L is given by
(A) a family {Aλ}λ of formulas in L and a family {aλ}λ of states of affairs
in U, such that
(B) for all λ, that is for all paired aλ and Aλ,
if aλ is the case in U then ΣL ` Aλ
if aλ is not the case in U then ΣL ` ¬Aλ
In such way the formulas belonging to {Aλ}λ are endowed with meaning: Aλ
means or refers to aλ.
13. A few important remarks are in order.
(a) As we have seen, to be a meaning-carrier is not simply a matter of
convention or definition or declaration. Semantics is not an arbitrary
assignment of states of affairs of the world to linguistic elements of
the theory.
(b) It is pointless to talk about the meaning of an isolated formula of the
theory. (Semantic holism) It is not only because a whole family of
formulas are endowed with meaning, “as a corporate body”, but also
because in condition (B) a big part of the axiomatic system can be
involved.
(c) It must be recognized that condition (B) is exactly the same as the
necessary and sufficient condition for the theory (L, S) to be true.
That is, the two conceptions meaning and truth are completely inter-
twined.
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(d) The semantics, in the above holistic sense, is a part and parcel of
physical theory. In case of empirical failure of a physical theory,
semantics is one of the possible object of revision. In other words,
semantics is as much hypothetical as any other part of the theory.
14. It must be clear that aλ – as a symbol in the meta-language we use to
describe the semantic relationship – stands for a state of affairs, a configura-
tion of the physical world. Also, according to the physico-formalist approach
“ΣL ` Aλ” and “ΣL ` ¬Aλ”, respectively, are states of affairs in the physical
world, facts of the physically embodied formal system L. Thus, what we ob-
serve in condition (B) is a kind of regularity or correlation between physical facts
of two parts of the physical world, L and U. Combining this with the thesis
of the principle of common cause, one must conclude that both semantic relation-
ship and the truth of the physical theory (consequently, our knowledge) must be
brought about by the underlying causal processes of the physical world, going
on in the common causal past of the two parts of the world L and U. This un-
derlying process is what we normally call learning through experience. That is, no
genuine knowledge of the physical world is possible without experience. By the same
token, no semantically meaningful talk about the physical world is possible without
experience. There is no a priori meaning and there is no a priori truth.3
15. Let us clarify then the role of logic and mathematics in our knowledge
of the physical world. One might ask: if mathematics is only about the formal
systems without meaning, how is it, then, possible that mathematical struc-
tures prove themselves to be so expressive in the physical applications? As
Richard Feynman put it: “I find it quite amazing that it is possible to predict
what will happen by mathematics, which is simply following rules which re-
ally have nothing to do with the original thing.” [10, p. 171]
We need to separate the sociological/practical aspect of this issue from the
epistemological one. Let me start with the sociological aspect. From sociologi-
cal point of view, by “mathematics” we mean that part of the axioms of L (see
point 11) which is traditionally considered as non-physical axioms. It must be
clear however that it is not “mathematics” alone by which the physicist can pre-
dict what will happen, but the physical axioms together with the logical and
mathematical axioms. The physicist, keeping, as long as possible, the logical
and mathematical axioms fixed – for good sociological/practical reason –, tunes
the physical axioms such that the theorems derivable from the unified system of
logical, mathematical, and physical axioms (together with the deduction rules)
+ the semantics, as a whole, be compatible with the empirical facts. Conse-
3The principle of common cause is the Reichenbachian thesis that no correlation without cau-
sation; every correlation is either due to a direct causal effect, or is brought about by a third factor,
a so-called common cause [26]. Due to the difficulties encountered in the EPR–Bell problem, many
argue that the principle fails in the realm of quantum mechanics. I do not wish to become em-
broiled, in this paper, in the debate as to whether the common cause principle, in precise formula-
tion, deserves to be regarded as universally valid principle. My own view is that it does; none of
the counter-examples provides a compelling reason to deny it. (Cf. [3, 15]) In any event, learning
from experience, as an existing and known physical process producing the correlation in question,
is a natural causal explanation; no reason to say that this is a correlation without need of explana-
tion, or to look for some mysterious alternative explanation like “pre-adaption” or “preestablished
harmony” (also see point 15).
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quently, the employed logical and mathematical structures in themselves need
not, and do not, reflect anything about the real world in order to be useful.
Let me recall an analogy I gave in [30]. You can experience a analogous
situation when you change the mouse driver on your computer (or just change
the mouse settings): first you feel that the pointer movements (“derived the-
orems”) generated by the new driver (“mathematics”) according to your pre-
viously habituated hand movements (“physical axioms”) do not faithfully re-
flect the arrangement of your screen content (experienced world). Then, keep-
ing the driver (and driver settings) fixed, you tune your hand movements –
through typical “trial and error” learning – such that the generated pointer
movements fit to the arrangement of your screen content.
Thus, there is no miraculous “preadaption” or “pre-established harmony”
involved just because certain aspects of empirical reality “fit themselves into
the forms provided by mathematics”. This is simply a result of the physicist’s
continuous choice from the store shelves of mathematics, and the continuous
tuning the physical axioms.
From epistemological point of view the situation is even more simple. In a
physical theory (L, S), the formal system L is a single undivided whole. As a
formal system, L can be the object of logical/mathematical investigation and
knowledge. In itself, however, it has nothing to do with the physical world de-
scribed by the physical theory (L, S). In case of empirical failure of the physical
theory (L, S), any element of L as well as the semantics can be the object of revi-
sion. Through this continuous “trial and error” process, the physicist tunes the
physical theory (L, S), as a whole, be compatible with the experienced world;
satisfy condition (B) in point 12.
Constitutive a priori reconsidered
16. Consider the following example. Given that L is consistent, one can
easily see that the following statements cannot hold true at the same time:
(i) A refers to a
(ii) ΣL ` A
(iii) a is not the case in U
since (i) and (iii), according to condition (B) in point 12, would imply ΣL ` ¬A,
in contradiction with (ii). Therefore, observing that a is not the case we are not
entitled to say that we observe that “¬A”. Simply because if a is not the case,
then condition (B) fails, and the whole semantics is lost. Therefore ¬A does
not carry meaning at all. That is to say, we are not able to attribute a feature,
whatsoever, to the physical reality in the situation when a is not the case.
17. Let us denote this unexpressed, unarticulated state of affairs by a∗. Once
a modified (or completely new) theory, (L′, S′), is constructed with a new fam-
ily of state of affairs
{
a′λ′
}
λ′ and a new family of formulas
{
A′λ′
}
λ′ , such that
a∗ = a′
λ′∗
and condition (B) in point 12 is satisfied, the corresponding A′
λ′∗
will
be attributed to a∗, as true feature of reality in state a∗.
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18. This example not only confirms what was said in point 13 (d), but also
sheds light on the constitutive role of semantics, similar to the constitutive role
of Reichenbach’s coordinative definitions we described in point 3. There are
however significant differences:
(a) The whole account I developed remains within the clear and mini-
mal ontological framework of physicalism.
(b) All entities involved are contingently existing physical objects.
(c) Whatever is the concrete physical process (point 14) producing the
correlation required in condition (B) of point 12, that is, producing
meaning and truth, it is a contingently existing part of the physical
reality.
(d) Therefore, the whole “epistemic agency” involved is embodied in
the physical world.
(e) The formal system in (L, S) plays, indeed, a similar role as Reichen-
bach’s “constitutive principle”; except that
– L has a clear ontological status; it is a part of the physical world,
– all facts of L are contingent facts of the physical world, there-
fore they do not generate necessarily true synthetic a priori state-
ments about the physical world, for sure.
(f) There is no “conceptual side of the coordination”. The constitu-
tive role of formal systems by no means entitles us to say that there
is a hypostatized a priori conceptual scheme in terms of which we
grasp the experienced reality, and that this conceptual scheme gen-
erates analytic truths. For, what there is is anything but conceptual:
we only have the physically existing formal systems which have no
meaning. Once an otherwise meaningless formula of a formal sys-
tem is provided with meaning, in the sense of point 12, it becomes
true or false in a non-analytic sense.
(g) Certainly, semantics plays constitutive role; not in the form of iso-
lated operational definitions of physical concepts, but in holistic
sense. Moreover, semantics is completely intertwined with the truth
of the theory; also, not in the form of the truth of isolated predictions,
but in holistic sense of (B) in point 12.
(h) In fact, therefore, what plays the constitutive role is the whole the-
ory (L, S), though, the whole theory is certainly not a priori. As we
have seen, however, aprioricity is not required for playing a consti-
tutive role. That is why there is no tension, whatsoever, between the
fact that the applied logical and mathematical structures as well as
the constructed semantics can change (see point 17) when a theory is
superseded by another one, on the one hand, and their constitutive
role in furnishing reality, on the other (cf. [12, 23, 17]).
(i) Finally, it is worthwhile to mention that the constitutive role of the
theory (L, S) in furnishing “the »continuum« of reality” [25, p. 50]
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with objects, properties, and relations, in itself, by no means implies
the denial of realism; the belief that the existence of the objects, prop-
erties, and relations posited by the theory is a real feature of reality.
What is true about scientific realism is also true about metaphysical
realism – if the distinction is meaningful at all. For a “metaphysical”
account must have the structure of (L, S) in order to be meaningful
and true, just in the sense we described in point 12.
19. Thus, the corrected formulation of the argument against intrinsic–
extrinsic distinction, outlined in point 5, is the following. The features (at-
tributes, qualities, properties) attributed to a real object are not possessed by
the object as a “thing-in-itself”; they require the existence of something else: a
physical theory (L, S) by means of which these features are constituted. The
existence of (L, S) however implies the existence of a physically embodied for-
mal system L and a real causal process in the physical world producing the
correlation required for both the semantics and the truth of the theory. All this
means that a physical object can possess a property only if other contingently
existing physical objects exist.
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